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Abstract
We propose to use endowments as a policy instrument in market design. Endowments
give agents the right to enjoy certain resources. For example in school choice, one can
ensure that low-income families have a shot at high-quality schools by endowing them
with a chance of admission.
We introduce two new criteria in resource allocation problems with endowments. The
first adapts the notion of justified envy to a model with endowments, while the second
is based on market equilibrium. Using either criteria, we show that fairness (understood
as the absence of justified envy, or as a market outcome) can be obtained together with
efficiency and individual rationality.
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with endowments
1 Introduction
Motivation: school choice and lotteries. School choice is the problem of allocating
children to schools when we want to take into account children’s (or their parents’)
preferences. Several large US school districts have in the last 15 years implemented school
choice programs that follow economists’ recommendation and are based on economic
theory.1 Practical implementation of school choice programs presents us with a number
of lessons and challenges.
The first lesson is that school choice should be guided by fairness, or justified fair-
ness. When given the choice of implementing either a fair or an efficient outcome, school
districts have consistently chosen fairness (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez,
2005; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005). One reason could be that district ad-
ministrators are concerned with litigation: if Alice prefers the school that student Bob
was allocated to, meaning that she envies Bob’s allocation, then the district can invoke
justified envy to argue as a defense that Bob had a higher priority than Alice at the school
in question. It is also likely that district administrators, and society as a whole, have
1Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez, 2005), New
York (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005), and Chicago (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013) are the leading
examples.
an intrinsic preference for fairness. Such a preference for fairness is important enough to
outweigh efficiency.
The second lesson is that school districts have a strong preference for controlling the
racial and socio-economic composition of their schools: so-called controlled school choice.
A common critique of existing school choice programs is that they have led to undesir-
able school compositions. For example, in Boston, schools have been left with too few
neighborhood children, which has motivated a move away from the system recommended
by economists (Dur, Kominers, Pathak, and So¨nmez, 2017). In New York City, the new
school choice system exhibits high degrees of racial segregation. Segregation in NYC
schools is not new, but the complaint is that the new school choice program may have
made it worse, and certainly has not helped. In the words of a recent New York Times
article “. . . school choice has not delivered on a central promise: to give every student
a real chance to attend a good school. Fourteen years into the system, black and His-
panic students are just as isolated in segregated high schools as they are in elementary
schools — a situation that school choice was supposed to ease.2” The article points to a
dissatisfaction with school composition, and access to the best schools.
The situation in NYC has reached a point where there are talks of doing away with
school priorities, and instead instituting a lottery. In fact, Professor Eric Nadelstern at
Columbia University, who served as deputy school chancellor when the new school choice
system was implemented, has recently proposed that children be allowed to apply to any
school, and have a lottery decide the allocations.3
Our paper seeks to make Nadelstern’s approach compatible with school choice. We
imagine that there is a lottery that gives an initial probabilistic allocation of children
to schools. The lottery could be as simple as giving each child the same chance of
attending any school. It could also reflect different objectives in controlled school choice,
such as giving each child a higher chance of attending his or her neighborhood school,
or giving each minority child a chance (literally, a positive probability) of attending the
2“The Broken Promises of Choice in New York City Schools”, New York Times, May 5th, 2017.
3See “Confronting Segregation in New York City Schools”, New York Times, May 15th, 2017.
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highest-ranked schools. Our model takes as primitive an arbitrary and given probabilistic
allocation of children to schools.
The initial allocation is typically not the final allocation, because we want preferences
to play a role. Therefore, we construct an exchange economy by regarding the initial
probabilistic allocation of each child as his or her endowment. Our main finding is that,
under reasonably general conditions, we can always find a probabilistic allocation that
takes into account children’s preferences so as to exhaust all the possible gains from
trade (efficiency), gives each child an allocation that is as least as good as his or her
initial endowment (individual rationality), and guarantees that no child justifiably envies
another, according to our notions of justified envy.
Our contribution. We investigate the meaning of fairness in the presence of endow-
ments. Endowments mean that agents start from unequal initial positions, and this
inequality may be reflected in the final outcome. We do not want to say that an outcome
is unfair if its unfairness can be traced to differences in the allocation of endowments.
For example, suppose that Alice and Bob are endowed with seats at two schools. The
final allocation of seats depends on agents’ preferences. If Alice envies Bob’s final allo-
cation, but her endowment was worse than Bob, then we may be willing to tolerate her
envy. Such inequity could simply be the product of an unequal starting point: Alice had
a much worse endowment than Bob to start with. In other words, the challenge is to
make sense of fairness among unequally endowed agents. We say that envy, or inequality,
among agents is justified if it can be traced to the agents’ differing endowments.
We investigate two different notions of fairness. The first notion, termed no justified
envy, is based on property rights defined by agents’ endowments: an agent has the right
to be at least as well off as she would be by consuming her endowments. The starting
point is the standard notion of fairness in matching and school choice. In the standard
notion of fairness, school priorities define property rights. We present a notion of no
justified envy where property rights defined by endowments play the role of the property
rights defined by priorities.
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Our second notion uses markets, and the price mechanism, as a basis for determining
fair allocations. When agents have the same endowments, market equilibria are fair, in
the sense that no agent envies another agent (Varian, 1974). We extend the idea that
market equilibrium prices guarantee fair outcomes to a model where agents’ endowments
may not be the same.
Importantly, our notions of fairness are compatible with efficiency. In the standard
model of school choice and matching, fairness and efficiency cannot generally both be
obtained. This will not be true in our model. We now proceed to explain our notions of
fairness in some more detail, and to briefly describe our main results.
Absence of justified envy is, as said, based on our understanding of endowments as
guaranteeing property rights. Each agent has the right to obtain her initially endowed
probabilistic allocation, and any deviation from her initial endowment must reflect her
preferences. Endowments therefore enshrine certain property rights: no agent would
accept an allocation that she regards as worse than her initial endowment. Now, consider
an allocation in which Alice envies Bob, meaning that she prefers Bob’s assignment to
her own. We say that Alice’s envy towards Bob is not justified if, if they were to switch
assignments, then Bob’s property rights would be violated. That is, Alice’s envy towards
Bob is not justified if Bob prefers his initial endowment to Alice’s assignment.
Our fairness notion is analogous to the standard definition of fairness based on priori-
ties, because priorities can also be thought of as granting property rights. In the presence
of priorities, Alice’s envy towards Bob is regarded as not justified if Bob has a higher
priority than Alice at the school he is assigned to. Let us consider the effect of switching
Alice’s and Bob’s assignments in a model with priorities. If the switch makes them both
better off, then the allocation in the market must not be efficient. However, recall that
our no-justified envy is compatible with efficiency. So to make a proper analogy let us
consider an efficient allocation. If Alice envies Bob, then efficiency demands that Bob
must regard Alice’s assignment as worse than his own. This means that Bob ranks his
assignment, at which he has a higher priority than Alice, over Alice’s. Think of Bob’s
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higher priority over Alice as a property right that Bob has relative to Alice for his as-
signment. This means that the switch would give Bob an assignment that is worse than
the school at which Bob has property rights. The notion of fairness with priorities is
therefore analogous to our notion of fairness.4
Our second notion of fairness is based on markets and prices. When all endowments
are equal, a market equilibrium is fair because no agent can envy any other agent. We
extend this idea to an economy with endowments. In equilibrium, Alice may envy Bob,
but only if Bob’s endowment is more valuable (at equilibrium market prices) than Alice’s.
In particular, when all endowments are the same, they have to be equally valuable, and
therefore no envy is possible. But more generally, we may think of the market process
itself as being fair because any envy can be traced to how endowments are valued. We
also provide a connection between market prices and agents’ preferences: we show that,
under certain hypotheses, if Alice envies Bob then a coalition of agents (a coalition that
includes Alice) would rather have more of Bob’s endowments than of Alice’s.
Our market equilibrium solution is a hybrid of the standard equal-income market
solution, and classical Walrasian equilibrium. Agents’ expenses in our market must be
debited against a budget constraint that is a weighted average of a fixed income, and an
income derived from selling endowments at market prices. Say that the weight on the
fixed income is α ∈ [0, 1] and the weight on the income from endowments is 1−α. When
α is zero, the market is a textbook Walrasian exchange economy, in which agents derive
income purely from selling their endowment at market prices. Unfortunately, the α = 0
4Fairness also serves as a defense against litigation. If Alice envies Bob and wants to bring the matter
to court, the most plausible remedy she could offer is for the two of them to switch assignments: the
school district should give Alice’s assignment to Bob, and Bob’s assignment to Alice. In an environment
with priorities, the district would counter-argue that Bob has a higher priority than Alice at Bob’s
assignment. In the absence of priorities, our fairness notion enables district administrators to argue
that such a switch is not possible because Alice’s assignment is not acceptable to Bob. Note that the
standard for rejecting the switch is independent of the allocation proposed: Bob’s endowment was fixed
before the allocation was determined, and the district has to respect that Bob has a right to insist on
his endowment.
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Walrasian model may not posses an equilibrium (see our discussion in Section 5.3), and
may have Pareto dominated equilibria (see our Section 5.2). We show, however, that
when α > 0 equilibrium always exists, and an equilibrium can be found that is Pareto
optimal. Moreover, by choosing α > 0 to be arbitrarily small, we can come as close a
desired to respecting individual rationality. Finally, as long as α < 1, the model allows
endowments to matter and play a role in the final allocation. As a consequence, in
equilibrium, if Alice envies Bob, her envy must be the reflection of Bob’s endowment
being more valuable than Alice’s, and (under some additional conditions) by a coalition
of agents wanting more of Bob’s endowments and less of Alice’s.
Before moving to the related literature, we want to emphasize that controlling school
choice by way of endowments has the benefit of being very transparent in the possibilities
that it guarantees for each child. Lotteries are familiar objects, and they are easy to
interpret. It will be clear to the families participating in the market that they can opt
for their endowed probabilistic allocation. It is, however, a change of focus from the
standard ideas in controlled school choice, where the final composition of the school is
the focus.
Our model is about access to schools; arguably about equality of opportunities. In
that sense, it is telling that the New York Times article we quoted from earlier talks
about giving students a chance to attend the best schools. It views the undesirable
school composition as a reflection of lack of chances, or opportunities. In our model, the
final composition of the school may differ from the initial allocations; and probably in
most cases, it will differ substantially from the initial allocation. Arguably, such differ-
ence is desirable because it reflects efficiency and childrens’ preferences, while respecting
individual rationality and fairness.
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2 Related literature.
The problem of controlled school choice was first analyzed formally by Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (2003), the paper that introduced school choice as a mechanism design
problem. The literature continued with, among others, Kojima (2012), Hafalir, Yenmez,
and Yildirim (2013), Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014), and Echenique and
Yenmez (2015). None of these papers, however, use endowments as a way to control
school choice. By using endowments we take the position that what matters is access
and opportunity, not the final composition of the schools. It may be that the final
outcome is more segregated than desired by the district, but the segregation would be
the result of agents’ preferences.
Hamada, Hsu, Kurata, Suzuki, Ueda, and Yokoo (2017) is the only paper we are aware
of that also uses initial endowments to control school choice. They assume that each
child owns one seat of some school as endowment. Their goal is to design strategy-proof
allocation mechanisms to meet the distributional constraint in the market and individual
rationality constraint of each child. Since they consider deterministic endowments and
ordinal preferences, and their fairness notions are based on priorities, their results are
unrelated to ours.
Our notion of justified envy is analogous to the fairness notion of Yılmaz (2010).
Yilmaz uses first-order stochastic dominance instead of utility functions, and says that
Alice justifiably envies Bob if she does not regard her allocation as first-order stochas-
tically dominating Bob’s, while any object that she obtains with positive probability in
her allocation is regarded by Bob as acceptable. An important difference between Yil-
maz’s paper and ours is that endowments are deterministic in his model and probabilistic
in ours. Finally, Yilmaz studies the probabilistic serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin,
2001), and as a consequence his results are simply unrelated to ours.
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) were the first to propose markets over lottery shares
to solve centralized allocation problems; they assume a fixed income for each agent,
independent of prices. Hylland and Zeckhauser make the point, which we elaborate on
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in Section 5.3, that a model with endowments would not work because equilibrium may
not exist. They also emphasize that equilibrium may not be efficient, and introduce the
“cheapest bundle” property that we employ as well in our version of the first welfare
theorem. It should be clear that allowing for endowments is a stark departure from
the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), and poses significant challenges. Many
other papers have followed Hylland and Zeckhauser in analyzing competitive equilibria
as solutions in market design. For example, Budish (2011), Ashlagi and Shi (2015), He,
Miralles, Pycia, Yan, et al. (2015) and He, Li, and Yan (2015). These authors explore
markets with exogenously given budgets: α = 1 in our model. When all agents have
equal budgets, there can be no envy in a competitive equilibrium. But equal budgets of
course eliminate any role for the initial endowments in the same blow as they eliminate
envy.
Our market solution is a hybrid of the standard “competitive equilibrium with equal
incomes” of Varian (1974), and the textbook model of a Walrasian exchange economy.
The exchange economy model allows for endowments to play a role justifying envy, but
equilibrium, as we have emphasized, may not exist. There may also exist Pareto ranked
Walrasian equilibria (see Section 5.2).
3 The model
Our model is essentially the standard model of an exchange economy in general equilib-
rium theory. The difference with the standard model is that agents consume lotteries:
consumption bundles cannot add up to more than one. This difference is far from minor.
For example, it results in the non-existence of Walrasian equilibrium, even for economies
that are otherwise well-behaved, and in the presence of Pareto-ranked Walrasian equi-
libria (see our discussions in 5.3 and 5.2 below). In fact, no known equilibrium existence
results apply to our model.
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Notation and preliminary definitions. The simplex {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj = 1} in Rn
is denoted by ∆n ⊆ Rn, while the set {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ 1} is denoted by ∆n− ⊆ Rn.
When n is understood, we simply use the notation ∆ and ∆−.
A function u : ∆n− → R is
• concave if, for any x, z ∈ ∆−, and λ ∈ (0, 1), λu(z)+(1−λ)u(x) ≤ u(λz+(1−λ)x);
• quasi-concave if, for each x ∈ ∆−, the set {z ∈ ∆− : u(z) ≥ u(x)} is convex.
• semi-strictly quasi-concave if, for any x, z ∈ ∆−, u(z) < u(x) and λ ∈ (0, 1) imply
that u(z) < u(λz + (1− λ)x).
• expected utility if it is linear. In this case we identify u with a vector u ∈ Rn and
denote u(x) as u · x.
• C1 if it can be extended to a continuously differentiable function defined on an
open set that contains ∆−.
Model. A discrete allocation problem is a tuple Γ = {S, I,Q, (ui, ωi)i∈I}, where:
• S = {sk}Lk=1 represents a set of indivisible objects.
• I = {ai}Ni=1 represents a set of agents, each of whom demands exactly one copy of
an object.
• Q = {qs}s∈S is a capacity vector, and qs ∈ N is the number of copies of object s.
For simplicity, we assume that
∑
s∈S qs = N , i.e., the number of copies of objects
is equal to the number of agents.
• For each agent i, ui : ∆L− → R is a continuous utility function defined on ∆L−.
• For each agent i, ωi ∈ ∆L is i’s endowment vector such that ωis is the fraction
of object s owned by i. We assume that all objects are owned by agents. So∑N
i=1 ω
i = Q.
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Allocations and Pareto optimality. An allocation in Γ is a vector x ∈ RLN+ , which
we write as x = (xi)Ni=1, with x
i ∈ ∆L−, such that∑
i∈I
xis = qs
for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S. When xis ∈ {0, 1} for all i and all s, x is a deterministic
allocation. The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem (Birkhoff, 1946; Von Neumann, 1953)
implies that every allocation is a convex combination of deterministic allocations.
An allocation x is acceptable to agent i if ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi); x is individually rational
(IR) if it is acceptable to all agents. We also define a notion of approximate individual
rationality: for any  > 0, x is -individually rational (-IR) if ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi)−  for all
i.
The notion of efficiency comes in three flavors: An allocation x is weak Pareto optimal
(wPO) if there is no allocation y such that ui(yi) > ui(xi) for all i; ε-weak Pareto optimal
(ε-PO), for ε > 0, if there is no allocation y such that ui(yi) > ui(xi) + ε for all i;
and Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no allocation y such that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i
and uj(yj) > uj(xj) for some j. In our model, the difference between wPO and PO
is significant because of the constraint that each xi cannot add up to more than 1.
This means that wPO is compatible with wasteful situations where we can use existing
resources to make some agents strictly better off, but cannot construct an allocation that
makes all agents strictly better off because there are agents that have achieved the largest
possible quantities of their most preferred goods.
Walrasian equilibrium. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. An α-slack Walrasian equilibrium is a pair
(x, p) such that x ∈ ∆N− , and p = (ps)s∈S ∈ RL+ is a price vector such that
1.
∑N
i=1 x
i =
∑N
i=1 ω
i; and
2. xi maximizes i’s utility within his α-modified budget:
xi ∈ argmax{ui(zi) : zi ∈ ∆− and p · zi ≤ α + (1− α)p · ωi};
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Property 1 means that x is an allocation, or that demand equals supply and all
markets clear.
A Walrasian equilibrium is a 0-slack Walrasian equilibrium. The following result is
well-known (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979).
Proposition 1. There are economies in which all agents utility functions are expected
utility, that posses no Walrasian equilibria.
The proposition re-appears, in context, as Proposition 3. Thus, Walrasian equilibria
may not exist in our model, even for very well behaved utility functions, and we are not
aware of any general existence results for our model. Section 5.3 elaborates further.
Fairness. As discussed before, we present two notions of fairness. The first tries to
parallel the standard definition of justified envy in the model of school choice with priori-
ties. The second is based on market equilibrium, and says that if an agent i envies j then
i’s endowment at equilibrium prices must be worth more than j’s. In turns, this means
that society values j’s endowment more than i’s endowment (see Theorem 4 below).
Our first notion of fairness relies on the idea of property rights. We regard agents as
having the right to consume their endowments. So agents have the right to be at least as
well off as they would be by consuming their endowments. Our fairness notion is based
on the idea that if an agent i envies another agent j in an allocation x (that is, i prefers
xj to xi), then switching their allocations must violate the property rights of j. That is,
j must prefer ωj to xi. As discussed in the Introduction, this fairness notion parallels
the standard definition of fairness in priority-based allocation problems, and provides an
argument for social planner to defend any possible complaint from any agent who feels
envy towards another.
Formally, we say an agent i has justified envy towards another agent j at an allocation
x if
ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) ≥ uj(ωj).
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We say that x has no justified envy (NJE) if no agent has justified envy towards any
other agent at x.
We explore some simple implications of NJE. In an IR and NJE allocation x, if ui = uj
and ui(ωi) ≥ uj(ωj), then it must be that ui(xi) ≥ uj(xj).5 That is, if two agents i and
j have equal preferences and both agree that i’s endowment is weakly better than j’s,
then both agree that i’s allocation in x is also weakly better than j’s. In particular, if
ui = uj and ui(ωi) = uj(ωj), then it must be that ui(xi) = uj(xj). So NJE and IR imply
equal treatment of equals (also called symmetry by Zhou, 1990).
We also define two variants of justified envy: one is stronger than justified envy, while
the other is weaker. We say that i has a strong justified envy (SJE) towards j at x if
ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) > uj(ωj). For any  > 0, we say i has an -justified envy
(-JE) towards j at x if ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) > uj(ωj)− . No strong justified envy
(NSJE) and no -justified envy (NJE) are defined similarly as before. It is easy to see
that
no -justified envy =⇒ no justified envy =⇒ no strong justified envy
Our second notion of fairness is based on α-slack Walrasian equilibrium. If (x, p) is a
α-slack Walrasian equilibrium for α ∈ (0, 1), and i envies j, then it must be the case that
p · ωj > p · ωi. In other words, i’s envy is not justified, because j’s endowment is more
valuable at market prices than i’s. This means (in a sense that is made precise below)
that society values j’s endowment more than i’s. Similarly to NJE, α-slach Walrasian
equilibrium also ensures an equal treatment property: if ωi = ωj, then i cannot envy j
in equilibrium.6
4 Main Results
Let Γ = {S, I,Q, (ui, ωi)i∈I} be a discrete allocation problem.
5If ui(xi) < uj(xj), then i’s envy towards j is justified because uj(xi) = ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi) ≥ uj(ωj).
6Of course, this is the idea in the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes of Varian (1974).
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Theorem 1. Suppose that agents’ utility functions in Γ are concave.
1. For any ε > 0, there exists an allocation that is ε-individually rational, ε-Pareto
optimal and has no ε-justified envy;
2. There exists an allocation that is individually rational, weak Pareto optimal and
has no strong justified envy.
Theorem 2. Suppose that agents’ utility functions in Γ are quasi-concave. For any
α ∈ (0, 1], there exists an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p). Moreover, if agents’
utility functions are semi-strictly quasi-concave, then x is Pareto optimal.
Theorem 3. Suppose that agents’ utility functions in Γ are semi-strictly quasi-concave.
For any ε > 0 there is α ∈ (0, 1] and an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p), such that
x is Pareto optimal and
max{ui(y) : y ∈ ∆− and p · y ≤ p · ωi} − ui(x) < ε.
In particular, x is ε-individually rational.
The next result clarifies why we think of α-Walras equilibria as justifying envy among
agents.
Theorem 4. Suppose that agents’ utility functions in Γ are concave and C1. Let (x, p) be
an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium. Denote by S = {i : ui(xi) = max{ui(zi) : zi ∈ ∆−}}
the set of satiated consumers, and by U = [N ] \ S. Suppose that ∑i∈U xi  0 and that i
envies j in x (ui(xj) > ui(xi)).
Then there exists a set of welfare weights θ ∈ RU++ such that if
v(t) = sup{
∑
i∈U
θiui(x˜i) : (x˜i) ∈ ∆U− and
∑
i∈U
x˜i ≤ ω¯ + t(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈S
xi},
then (xi)i∈U solves the problem for v(0), and v(t) < 0 for all t small enough.
The meaning of Theorem 4 is that if an agent i envies j then i’s endowment is more
valuable to a coalition of players U (a coalition that includes i!) in a specific sense.
It is more valuable to U in the sense that there are welfare weights for the members
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of U such that a change in agents’ endowment towards having more of i’s endowment
and less of j’s leads to a worse weighted utilitarian outcome. The results requires that∑
i∈U x
i  0 simply to ensure that when we subtract ωj we do not force some agent to
consume negative quantities of some good.
5 Discussion
5.1 Scope of application of our results
In this section we discuss some applications of our model. The first remark we should
make is that it is possible to generalize our model to an environment where the total
amount of consumption of an agent is bounded above by some arbitrary T i > 0, and
where i’s endowment also sums up to T i. This allows us to capture the phenomenon
of time banks, where agents exchange labor. One example of time banks is child care
cooperatives.
The rest of our applications are to school choice. We argue that by properly designing
the initial endowments of students, we can achieve many goals in school choice. This is
in contrast to the more common approach of designing priorities in the literature.
Egalitarian school choice. If a school district wants to implement an egalitarian
school choice in which no student is favored ex-ante, then a natural solution is to give
students equal fractions of the seats of each school as initial endowments. That is, each
student i owns an endowment vector ωi = ( qs|I|)s∈S. Then there exits an allocation with the
desirable properties stated in Theorem 1. In particular, individual rationality here implies
equal-division lower bound.7 Egalitarianism here refers to equality of opportunities. The
allocation after preferences being taken into account can be very different from a uniform
distribution.
7See Thomson (1987); an allocation x satisfies equal division lower bound if ui(xi) ≥ ui(e) where
e = ( qs|I| )s∈S , exactly as stated here.
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Respecting neighborhood priority. Suppose in a school district each student lives
in the neighborhood of one school, and the number of seats of each school equals the
number of students in its neighborhood. If the district wants to guarantee that each
student is able to attend his neighborhood school if he or she wants, then a natural
solution is to give each student a seat in his neighborhood school as initial endowment.
That is, for each student i, ωi = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) where ωis = 1 if and only if s is the
neighborhood school of i.
This special endowment structure may remind the reader of the Top Trading Cyle
(TTC) mechanism. Here we emphasize that the allocation of TTC may not satisfy NJE.
For example, suppose there are three students i, j, k with distinct endowments. i, k most
prefer j’s endowment, i least prefers his own endowment, and j most prefers i’s endow-
ment. TTC will let i, j trade their endowments and let k keep his endowment. However,
in this allocation k has justified envy towards i since his endowment is acceptable to i.
Affirmative action. Suppose there are two types of students: majority and minority.
If a school district wants to implement affirmative action for minority students, it can
give each minority student some fractions of popular schools in their initial endowments.
This guarantees that minority students have chances to attend popular schools if they
so desire, and if some of them give up their chances, they do so in exchange for more
favorable allocations.
Distributional constraints. Some districts may have distributional goals in the com-
position of its schools. For example, in an ideal composition of each school, each racial
or ethnic group may have a given percentage in the target composition. As we stated
before, such a goal is hard to achieve through our approach. While the initial endowment
may reflect group quotas, the final allocation results from students exchanging allocations
may be quite different from the initial endowment.
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5.2 Efficiency
The first welfare theorem is not true in our model. Walrasian equilibria, and even α-
slack Walrasian equilibria with α > 0, may fail to be Pareto efficient. Example 1 below
illustrates the point by exhibiting Pareto-ranked Walrasian equilibria.
The finding in Theorem 2 relies on a property of the α-slack Walrasian equilibria that
we find under semi-strictly quasiconcave utilities: a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p)
satisfies the cheapest-bundle property if, for each i, xi minimizes expenditure p · zi among
all the zi ∈ ∆− for which ui(zi) = ui(xi). The notion of a cheapest bundle, and its role
in the first welfare theorem, was already established by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).
Example 1. Given is an economy with two agents and two schools. Agents have expected
utilities given by the following vNM indexes:
i uis1 u
i
s2
1 1 1
2 1 100
And endowments ωi = (1/2, 1/2).
Consider the allocations x = ((1, 0), (0, 1)) and y = ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)). Note that
x Pareto dominates y.
The following table summarizes how both x and y may be supported as Walrasian
equilibria, both with α > 0 and α = 0. The first welfare theorem fails because agents have
satiated preferences, not because we focus on equilibria with slack.
α allocation p α + (1− α)p · ωi
0 x (1, 1) 1
1/2 x (1, 1) 1
0 y (0, 1) 1/2
1/2 y (0, 2) 1
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The table is hopefully obvious, but it may be useful to detail why y is an equilibrium
allocation with α = 0. Note that income with prices (0, 1) is 1/2 for each agent. Agent 1
is happy to spend his income purchasing x1 = (1/2, 1/2) for a (global) utility maximum.
Agent 2 spends all his income on school s2 and purchases a 1/2 share in s2, but optimizes
by also hitting his add-to-one constraint and purchasing a 1/2 share in s1.
Theorem 5. Any Walrasian equilibrium with slack is weakly Pareto optimal, and any
Walrasian equilibrium with slack and the cheapest-bundle property is Pareto optimal.
5.3 The Hylland and Zeckhauser example
A Walrasian equilibrium (a 0-slack equilibrium) may not exist in our model. We present
a non-existence example originally due to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), and we show
how the symmetric Pareto optimal allocation in this example can be sustained as a
α-slack Walrasian equilibrium with any α ∈ (0, 1] (Proposition 3).
Given is an economy with three agents and two schools, A and B. School B has two
seats. We can model this as there being three schools: {s1, s2, s3} with s2 and s3 being
copies of school B with a capacity of one.
Agents have expected utilities given by the following vNM indexes:
i uis1 u
i
s2
uis3
1 100 1 1
2 100 1 1
3 1 100 100
Endowments are ωi = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for i = 1, 2, 3.
Proposition 2. There is no Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose (towards a contradiction) that (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium. To
simplify, let a B subindex indicate s2 or s3 and an A subindex indicate s1. Since two
copies of B are identical, they have wlog the same price in equilibrium.
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Suppose first that pB > 0. Normalize PB to one. Then all agents have the same
positive budget. If pA = 0, then 1 and 2 would each buy one copy of A, which is a
contradiction. So pA must be positive. This further implies that A has no excess supply.
The preferences of agents imply that 1 and 2 must each obtain a half of A. Therefore,
1/3pA+2/3 ≥ 1/2pA, and we obtain pA ≤ 4. However, if pA < 4, 1 and 2 would spend all
of their budgets on A, and each obtain more than a half of A, which is a contradiction.
So it must be that 1/3pA + 2/3 = 1/2pA and pA = 4. But this means that at most 3
demands B and B must have excess supply, which contradicts the positive price of B.
Now suppose pB = 0 and pA > 0. Then 3 must obtain one copy of B, that is,
x3 = (0, 1). Since pA is positive, 1 and 2 must each obtain a half of A. However, their
budget of 1/3pA cannot afford such an allocation.
Consider the allocation x defined by:
i xis1 x
i
s2
xis3
1 1/2 1/2 0
2 1/2 1/2 0
3 0 0 1
Proposition 3. For any α ∈ (0, 1], there is a Walrasian equilibrium with α-slack that
supports the allocation x.
Proof. Let α ∈ (0, 1] and
p = (
6α
1 + 2α
, 0, 0).
Then p · ωi = 2α
1+2α
and
α + (1− α)p · ωi = α + 2α
2 + (2α− 2α2)
1 + 2α
=
3α
1 + 2α
= p · xi,
for i = 1, 2.
Agents 1 and 2 can improve by purchasing more s1, but they cannot afford any more.
They can only afford a 1/2 share in s1 and buy 1/2 in s2 for free. They can improve by
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purchasing more s2 at the zero price, but that would not be feasible in ∆−. Agent 3 is
optimizing by choosing x3s3 = 1 for a price of zero.
Note that in an equilibrium supporting x, the value of agents 1 and 2’s endogenous
income (p · ωi) in equilibrium is 2α/(1 + 2α). So the value of the α-slack (the exogenous
part of the budget) relative to the value of the endogenous p · ωi is
1 + 2α
2
→ 1
2
as α → 0. While α shrinks to zero, the value of the exogenous income is not negligible.
In the same spirit, the following proposition shows that the average endogenous budget
will always be below the exogenous budget of one.
Proposition 4. If (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium with slack α ∈ (0, 1] then
1
n
n∑
i=1
p · ωi ≤ 1
Proof. Note that p · (xi − ωi) ≤ α(1− p · ωi). Sum over i to obtain:
0 = p ·
(∑
i
xi − ω¯
)
≤ α(n− p · ω¯).
Proposition 4 puts an upper bound on the average endogenous income. It cannot
exceed the exogenous income of 1. In particular this means that the economy needs
outside “money.”
Proposition 4 reveals more than the proof of Theorem 2, which bound prices by the
inequality:
pl(minl∈[L] ω¯l − ε)
N
≤ 1.
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6 An example of envy between agents with identical
endowment.
We present an example of a discrete allocation problem in which all agents have expected
utility preferences, together with an allocation that is individually rational, Pareto op-
timal, and satisfies no strong justified envy. In the example, one agent envies another
agent even though they have equal endowments.
The example matters for two reasons. First, because one may think that no-envy
among agents with equal endowments is intrinsically desirable. After all, we have tied
the notion of justified envy to endowments; we have insisted on fairness by “controlling
for endowments.” The idea behind the example, the explanation for what makes the
example work is, however, straightforward, and illustrates that endowments are not the
end of the story. The two agents in question have equal endowments, but they have
different preferences. Through their preferences, the two agents play very different roles
in the economy. Other agents “trade” with the two agents in question, and the outcome
can be explained through such trades. Because the agents’ preferences are different,
they interact with the remaining agents in very different ways. Hence it results in envy.
Put differently, an agent can be valuable to others because she has a very desirable
endowment, or because she is willing to trade in ways that enhance the welfare of others.
The example we present in this section illustrates the role of preferences in generating
value.
The second reason for why the example is important is that it suggests that our no-
tion of fairness may fail to be incentive compatible. We have not specified a selection
mechanism, and opted not to discuss incentives and strategy-proofness, but the example
conveys some insights. One agent envies another even though they have equal endow-
ments. This fact suggests that one agent may want to pretend to be the agent that
he envies. In a large economy, in which the number of agents who report each type of
preference does not change very much after a misreport, it stands to reason that such a
misreport would not be profitable. Of course, the example we present here falls short of
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proving that if we were to define a fair mechanism it would not be strategy proof.
Example 2. In the example there are five agents, labeled i = 1, . . . , 5, and three schools,
s1, s2 and s3. There are two copies (seats) of schools s2 and s3. There is only one copy
of school s1. In the example, all the “action” involves agents 1 and 2. The remaining
three agents are, in a sense, residual; they are also identical.
The agents’ von-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities are as described in the following table:
i uis1 u
i
s2
uis3
1 3 1 2
2 3 2 1
3 2 3 1
4 2 3 1
5 2 3 1
The agents’ endowments are:
i ωis1 ω
i
s2
ωis3
1 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
3 1/3 0 2/3
4 1/3 0 2/3
5 1/3 0 2/3.
Observe that agents 1 and 2 have identical endowments.
Finally, consider the following allocation x:
i xis1 x
i
s2
xis3
1 0 0 1
2 1/2 0 1/2
3 1/6 2/3 1/6
4 1/6 2/3 1/6
5 1/6 2/3 1/6
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Observe that agent 1 envies agent 2, as
u1 · x1 = 2 < 3/2 + 2/2 = u1 · x2.
The envy is not justified, however, as
u2 · x1 = 1 < 2 = u2 · ω2.
In fact, it is easy to see that x has no strong justified envy.
It is also easy to see that the allocation x is individually rational and Pareto optimal.
In any PO allocation y, we cannot have y1s2 > 0, as agent 1 and any agent j ∈ {3, 4, 5}
are willing to trade school 2 for any other school. So y1 must be a convex combination of
(1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1). To make agent 1 better off then we would need to give agent 1 some
shares in school 3, but these can only come at the expense of agent 2. To make agent
2 better off, she would need to get more shares in school 3, but these can only come at
the expense of agents 3,4 and 5. These agents could only exchange shares in school 3 for
shares in school 2, which agent 2 does not have. All agents 2, 3, 4 and 5 rank schools 3
and 1 in the same way.
7 Proof of Theorem 1
For given ε > 0, define
A∗ = {x is ε-individually rational and ε-Pareto optimal}.
It is easy to see that A∗ is nonempty and compact.8
8A∗ is nonempty since the endowment allocation w is individually rational and any allocation strictly
Pareto dominating w is individually rational. Let {xn} ⊆ A∗ and xn → x. It is obvious that x is
an allocation since the set of allocations is closed. Since ui(xin) ≥ ui(ωi) − ε for all n, in the limit
ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi)−ε. So x is ε-individually rational. Suppose x is not ε-Pareto optimal. Then there exists
an allocation y such that ui(yi) > ui(xi)+ε for all i. For big enough n, it must be that ui(yin) > u
i(xin)+ε
for all i, which contradicts the ε-Pareto optimality of xn.
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For any λ ∈ ∆, define
φ(λ) = argmax{
n∑
i=1
λiui(xi)− δ
n∑
i=1
‖xi − (1, . . . , 1)‖ : (xi)ni=1 ∈ A∗},
where δ > 0 is small enough such that
δmax
x∈A∗
n∑
i=1
‖xi − (1, . . . , 1)‖ < ε.
Since all ui are continuous and concave and
∑n
i=1 ‖xi − (1, . . . , 1)‖ is continuous
and strictly convex, the objective function
∑n
i=1 λ
iui(xi) − δ∑ni=1 ‖xi − (1, . . . , 1)‖ is
continuous and strictly concave. Also, A∗ is compact. Thus φ : ∆ → A∗ is a function
(singleton-valued), and, by the Maximum Theorem, continuous.
For any agent i, define
Ci = {λ ∈ ∆ : @j ∈ I s.t i has an ε-justified envy towards j at φ(λ)}
In the following two lemmas we prove that {Ci}ni=1 is a Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz
(KKM; see Theorem 5.1 in Border (1989)) covering of the simplex ∆.
Lemma 1. For every i ∈ I, Ci is closed.
Proof. Let λn be a sequence in C
i such that λn → λ ∈ ∆. Let xn = φ(λn). By continuity
of φ, xn → x = φ(λ) ∈ A∗. Now we prove that λ ∈ Ci, that is, i does not have an
ε-justified envy towards any other agent. Suppose that there is an agent j such that
ui(xj) > ui(xi) and uj(xi) > uj(ωj) − ε. Since ui and uj are continuous, for n large
enough we have ui(xjn) > u
i(xin) and u
j(xin) > u
j(ωj) − ε, which contradicts that i has
no ε-justified envy at xn. Therefore, λ ∈ Ci and Ci is closed.
Lemma 2. For every λ ∈ ∆, λ ∈ ∪i∈supp(λ)Ci.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for some λ ∈ ∆, λ /∈ ∪i∈supp(λ)Ci. Let
x = φ(λ). Then for every i ∈ supp(λ) there exists some j such that ui(xj) > ui(xi) and
uj(xi) > uj(wj)− ε.
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Suppose first that there exists some i and j in the aforementioned situation such that
j /∈ supp(λ). Then consider an allocation y in which i, j exchange their allocations in x,
and the other agents keep their allocations in x (that is, yi = xj, yj = xi, and yh = xh
for all h /∈ {i, j}). Then y is ε-individually rational and ∑ni=1 λiui(xi) < ∑ni=1 λiui(yi).
Note that
∑
h∈I ‖xh − 1‖ =
∑
h∈I ‖yh − 1‖. So
n∑
i=1
λiui(xi)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖xh − 1‖ <
n∑
i=1
λiui(yi)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖yh − 1‖.
By definition of φ, then, y /∈ A∗. Since y is an ε-individually rational allocation,
it cannot be ε-Pareto optimal. So there is a ε-Pareto optimal allocation z such that
ui(zi) > ui(yi) + ε for all i. Then z must be ε-individually rational and belong to A∗.
By our choice of δ,
n∑
i=1
λiui(yi)−δ
∑
h∈I
‖yh−1‖ <
n∑
i=1
λiui(zi)−δmax
x∈A∗
∑
h∈I
‖xh−1‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
λiui(zi)−δ
∑
h∈I
‖zh−1‖.
Therefore,
n∑
i=1
λiui(xi)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖xh − 1‖ <
n∑
i=1
λiui(zi)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖zh − 1‖,
which contradicts the definition of x = φ(λ).
The above argument means that every i ∈ supp(λ) has an ε-justified envy towards
some j ∈ supp(λ). Then, since the set of agents in supp(λ) is finite, there is a cycle
i1, . . . iK in supp(λ) such that i1 has an ε-justified envy towards i2, i2 has an ε-justified
envy towards i3, and so on until iK has an ε-justified envy towards i1. We can construct
a new allocation y by letting agents in the cycle exchange their allocations. As before, we
have that
∑
h∈I ‖xh − 1‖ =
∑
h∈I ‖yh − 1‖ because y obtained from x by a permutation
of the assignments that the agents obtain. Then we have
n∑
i=1
λiui(xi)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖xh − 1‖ <
n∑
i=1
λiui(yi)− δ
∑
h∈I
‖yh − 1‖.
As before, y is ε-individually rational but cannot be ε-Pareto optimal. Then as before
we can find an allocation z ∈ A∗ that results in a contradiction.
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Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is an application of the KKM lemma: see Theorem 5.1
in Border (1989).
By Lemmas 1 and 2, {Ci}ni=1 is a KKM covering of ∆. So there exists λ∗ε ∈ ∩ni=1Ci.
Let x∗ε = φ(λ
∗
ε). Then x
∗
ε is ε-individually rational, ε-Pareto optimal and has no ε-justified
envy.
Now let {εn} be a sequence such that εn > 0 for all n and εn → 0. Let x∗n be
the allocation found above for each εn. Since the sequence {x∗n} is bounded, it has a
subsequence {x∗nk} that converges to some x∗. Since the set of allocations is closed, x∗
is an allocation. We prove that x∗ is individually rational, weak Pareto optimal and has
no strong justified envy.
Since ui(x∗ink) > u
i(ωi)− εnk for all nk and all i, in the limit ui(x∗i) ≥ ui(ωi) for all i.
So x∗ is individually rational. Suppose x∗ is not weak Pareto optimal, then there exists an
allocation y such that ui(yi) > ui(x∗i) for all i. For big enough nk, ui(yi) > ui(x∗ink) + εnk
for all i, which contradicts the εnk-Pareto optimality of x
∗
nk
. Suppose some agent i has a
envy towards another agent j in x∗; that is, ui(x∗j) > ui(x∗i). Then for big enough nk,
ui(x∗jnk) > u
i(x∗ink). Since x
∗
nk
has no εnk-justified envy, u
j(x∗ink) ≤ uj(ωj) − εnk . In the
limit we have uj(x∗i) ≤ uj(ωj). That is, i does not have a strong justified envy towards
j.
8 Proof of Theorem 2.
We prove the second statement of the theorem: the existence of a α-slack Walrasian
equilibrium with the cheapest bundle property. Remark 1 below outlines the difference
with the proof of the first statement in the theorem.
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Let
vi = max{ui(x) : x ∈ ∆−}
Bi(p) = {x ∈ ∆− : p · x ≤ α + (1− α)p · ωi}
di(p) = argmax{ui(x) : x ∈ Bi(p)}
di(p) = argmin{p · x : x ∈ di(p)}
V i(p) = max{ui(x) : x ∈ Bi(p)}
zi(p) = di(p)− ωi and z(p) =
N∑
i=1
zi(p).
Note that vi is the largest utility that i can attain. Bi is the budget set, di is demand,
di is cheapest-demand, V i is i’s indirect utility function. zi is i’s excess demand corre-
spondence given the cheapest-bundle selection, and Z the aggregate excess demand.
We also use the notation ω¯ =
∑
i∈[n] ωi.
Lemma 3. If V i(p) < vi then di(p) = di(p).
Proof. Let x ∈ di(p). We shall prove that p · x = α + (1− α)p · ωi, which means we are
done because it implies that all bundles in di(p) cost the same at prices p. Let z ∈ ∆− be
such that ui(z) = vi > ui(x), and note that for any ε ∈ (0, 1), ui(εz + (1− ε)x) > ui(x)
by the semi-strict quasi-concavity of ui. Since εz + (1 − ε)x ∈ ∆−, this means that
p · (εz + (1 − ε)x) > α + (1 − α)p · ωi for any ε ∈ (0, 1). But this is only possible, for
arbitrarily small ε, if p · x ≥ α + (1− α)p · ωi. Since x ∈ Bi(p) we have established that
p · x = α + (1− α)p · ωi.
Lemma 4. If V i(p) = vi then
di(p) = argmin{p · x : ui(x) = vi and x ∈ ∆−}.
Proof. Let x ∈ di(p). Then for any z ∈ ∆− with p · z < p · x, z ∈ Bi(p). So ui(z) < vi.
Therefore, if z ∈ argmin{p·x : ui(x) = vi and x ∈ ∆−}, then p·z = p·x ≤ α+(1−α)p·ωi,
and therefore
di(p) ⊇ argmin{p · x : ui(x) = vi and x ∈ ∆−}.
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The converse set inclusion follows similarly because if x is not in the righ-hand set, there
would exist a z ∈ ∆− with p · z < p · x and ui(z) = vi, which is not possible as such a zi
would be in Bi(p).
Let ε ∈ (0,minl∈[L] ω¯l) and
p¯ =
N
minl∈[L] ω¯l − ε > 0.
Lemma 5. di is upper hemi-continuous on [0, p¯]L
Proof. We shall prove that di has a closed graph. Let (xn, pn)→ (x, p) with xn ∈ di(pn)
for all n.
First, consider the case where V i(p) < vi. By the maximum theorem, V i is continuous,
so V i(pn) < v
i for all n large enough. Then Lemma 3 implies that x ∈ di(p) as di is
upper hemi-continuous.
Second, consider the case where V i(p) = vi. We know that x ∈ di(p) as di is upper
hemi continuous. Suppose (towards a contradiction) that x /∈ di(p). Then there is
y ∈ di(p) with
p · y < p · x ≤ α + (1− α)p · ωi.
Then pn · y < α + (1 − α)pn · ωi for all n large enough. Since y ∈ di(p) and V i(p) = vi,
ui(y) = vi. This means that V i(pn) = v
i for all n large enough, as y ∈ Bi(pn).
By, Lemma 4, then, xn ∈ argmin{p · x : ui(x) = vi and x ∈ ∆−} for all n large
enough. But the correspondence
p 7→ argmin{p · x : ui(x) = vi and x ∈ ∆−}.
is upper hemicontinous (by the maximum theorem), so x ∈ argmin{p · x : ui(x) =
vi and x ∈ ∆−}; a contradiction.
Consider the correspondence φ : [0, p¯]L → [0, p¯]L defined by
φl(p) = {min{max{0, ζl + pl}, p¯} : ζ ∈ z(p)}.
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Lemma 6. φ is upper hemi-continuous, convex- and compact- valued.
Proof. The aggregate excess demand under the cheapest selection, z, is upper hemi-
continuous by Lemma 5. It is easy to see that this implies the upper hemi-continuity of
φ. Similarly, convex and compact values are immediate.
By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem there is p∗ ∈ [0, p¯]L with p∗ ∈ φ(p∗). We shall
prove that p∗ is an equilibrium price. Note that there exists ζ ∈ z(p∗) such that
p∗l = min{max{0, ζl + p∗l }, p¯}. (1)
Lemma 7. p∗ · ζ ≥ 0.
Proof. If p∗ · ζ < 0 then there is some good l with p∗l > 0 and ζl < 0. By Equation 1,
then, p∗l = p
∗
l + ζl, which is not possible as ζl < 0.
Lemma 8. p∗l < p¯ for all l ∈ [L]
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is l for which p∗l = p¯. Then p
∗
l > 0,
so Equation 1 means that p¯ ≤ ζl + p∗l = ζl + p¯. Let ζ =
∑
i x
i − ω¯, with xi ∈ di(p∗). The
definition of Bi(p) means that
p∗ · (xi − ωi) ≤ α(1− p∗ · ωi),
for all i ∈ [N ]. Thus, summing over i we obtain that p∗ · ζ ≤ α(N − p∗ · ω¯).
Now, by definition of p¯, we have that
p∗ · ω¯ ≥ p¯ω¯l > p¯(min
l∈[L]
ω¯l − ε) = N.
Thus, p∗ · ζ ≤ α(N − p∗ · ω¯) implies that p∗ · ζ < 0, in contradiction to Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. ζ = 0
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Proof. By Lemma 8 and Equation (1),
p∗l = max{0, ζl + p∗l } (2)
for all l ∈ [L].
Equation 2 implies two things. First, that ζl > 0 is not possible for any l. Hence
ζ ≤ 0. Second, that if ζl < 0 then p∗l = 0.
Suppose then, towards a contradiction, that that ζl < 0 for some good l, and corre-
spondingly that p∗l = 0. Now, ζl < 0 and ζ ≤ 0 means that
0 >
∑
l
ζl =
∑
l
∑
i
xil −
∑
l
ω¯l =
∑
i
∑
l
xil −N.
So there is some agent i for which
∑
l x
i
l < 1. Agent i can then increase his consumption
of good l without violating the constraint that consumption lie in ∆−. Given that p∗l = 0,
the increase in consumption of good l would also not violate the budget constraint. So
there exist a bundle in Bi(p) with strictly more of good l, and the same amount of every
other good, than xi. This contradicts the strict monotonicity of ui, and the fact that
xi ∈ di(p∗).
Remark 1. The proof uses semi-strict quasiconcavity only in the proof of upper hemicon-
tinuity of di. To prove existence of an equilibrium without imposing the cheapest-bundle
property, observe that continuity and quasiconcavity of ui is enough to ensure that di is
upper hemicontinuous, and takes convex and compact valued. If z is defined from di in
place of di, the proof as written shows the existence of a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium.
9 Proof of Theorem 3
Let dH denote the Hausdorff distance between two sets in R
L. So,
dH(A,B) = max{sup{inf{‖x−y‖ : y ∈ B} : x ∈ A}, sup{inf{‖x−y‖ : x ∈ A} : y ∈ B}}.
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Let Bi(p, α) denote the budget set given a price vector p and slack α ∈ [0, 1]. Let
B¯i(p, α) = {x ∈ RL+ : p · x = α + (1 − α)p · ωi denote the budget line. Note that
Bi(p, α) = {x ∈ ∆− : ∃y ∈ B¯i(p, α) s.t. x ≤ y}.
Lemma 10. For any δ > 0 there is α > 0 such that if p is the Walrasian equilibrium with
slack α found in Theorem 2, then for any i, either p ·ωi < 1 or dH(B¯i(p, α), B¯i(p, 0)) < δ.
Proof. Consider the price p¯ defined in the proof of Theorem 2. Note that if p is a price
obtained by application of the theorem, then p ∈ [0, p¯]L. Note also that p¯ is independent
of α.
Let K = sup{‖x‖ : x ∈ ∆−}. Now choose α ∈ (0, 1) such that
sup{
∣∣∣∣1− α + (1− α)p · ωip · ωi
∣∣∣∣K : p ∈ [0, p¯]L and p · ωi ≥ 1} < δ
Let x ∈ B¯i(p, 0), then γx ∈ B¯i(p, α), where
γ =
α + (1− α)p · ωi
p · ωi .
Note that
‖x− γx‖ = |1− γ| ‖x‖ < δ.
Thus inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, α)} < δ, and therefore
sup{inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, α)}x ∈ B¯i(p, 0)} < δ.
In a similar vein, we can show that
sup{inf{‖x− y‖ : y ∈ B¯i(p, 0)}x ∈ B¯i(p, α)} < δ,
and thus dH(B
i(p, 0), Bi(p, α)) < δ.
To prove the theorem, let δ > 0 be such that, for any p ∈ [0, p¯]L, if dH(Bi(p, 0), Bi(p, α)) <
δ then ∣∣max{ui(x) : x ∈ Bi(p, α)} −max{ui(x) : x ∈ Bi(p, 0)}∣∣ < ε.
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For such δ, let α be as in Lemma 10.
For any i, if p · ωi < 1 then Bi(p, 0) ⊆ Bi(p, α), so
max{ui(y) : y ∈ ∆− and p · y ≤ p · ωi} − ui(x) < 0 < ε.
If, on the contrary, p · ωi ≥ 1, then Lemma 10 implies that dH(Bi(p, 0), Bi(p, α)) < δ,
and the result follows from the definition of δ.
10 Proof of Theorem 5
Let ui(yi) > ui(xi) for all i. Then
p · (yi − ωi) > α(1− p · ωi) ≥ p · (xi − ωi).
Sum over i to obtain:
p ·
(∑
i
yi − ω¯
)
> α(n− p · ω¯) ≥ p ·
(∑
i
xi − ω¯
)
= 0.
Thus y cannot be an allocation.
In second place, suppose that (x, p) is an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium in which each
xi satisfies the cheapest-bundle property. Then, for any yi ∈ ∆−, ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) implies
that p · yi ≥ p · xi, while ui(yi) > ui(xi) implies that p · yi > p · xi. Thus, if (yi)i∈[N ]
Pareto dominates x, adding up gives p ·∑i yi > p · xi = p · ω¯, as x is an allocation. Then
(yi)i∈[N ] cannot be an allocation.
11 Proof of Theorem 4
Our first observation establishes the relation between envy and the value of endowments
at equilibrium prices.
Lemma 11. Let (x, p) be a Walrasian equilibrium with slack α ∈ (0, 1]. If i envies j,
then p · (xj − xi) > 0 and p · (ωj − ωi) > 0.
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Proof. Let i envy j, so ui(xj) > ui(xi). Then utility maximization implies that
α + (1− α)p · ωj ≥ p · xj > α + (1− α)p · ωi ≥ p · xi,
where the strict inequality follows because xj ∈ ∆−. So p ·(xj−xi) > 0 and p ·(ωj−ωi) >
0.
Now consider a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p). Agent i’s maximization problem
is:
max
x∈RL+
ui(x) + λi(I i − p · x) + γi(1− 1 · x)
Where I i = α + (1− α)p · ωi, λi is a multiplier for the budget constraint, and γi for
the
∑
l x
i
l ≤ 1 constraint.
Utility functions are C1. The first-order conditions for the maximization problems
are then:
∂lu
i(xi)− λipl − gi
= 0 if x
i
l > 0
≤ 0 if xil = 0,
where ∂lu
i(xi) denotes the partial derivative of ui with respect to xil.
Observe that if p ·xi < α+(1−α)p ·ωi, then the budget constraint is not binding and
λi = 0. As a consequence, ui(xi) = max{ui(zi) : zi ∈ ∆−}. Let S = {i ∈ [N ] : p · xi <
α+(1−α)p·ωi} be the set of satiated consumers. Let U = {i ∈ [N ] : p·xi = α+(1−α)p·ωi}
be the set of unsatiated, and observe that we can let λi > 0 for all i ∈ U . Consider the
two stage social program:
Stage 1:
maxy˜∈(∆−)S
∑
i∈S u
i(y˜i)
Stage 2:
maxy˜∈(∆−)U
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(y˜i)∑
i∈U y˜
i ≤ ω¯ −∑i∈S xi
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Note that (xi)i∈S solves Stage 1, while satisfying
∑
i∈S x
i ≤ w¯, and that given (xi)i∈S,
(xi)i∈U solves Stage 2. That this is so follows from the fact that (xi)i∈U solves the first-
order conditions for the Stage 2 problem with Lagrange multiplier p for the constraint
that
∑
i∈U y˜
i ≤ ω¯ −∑i/∈S xi.
Now use the assumption that
∑
i∈U x
i  0. This means that there exists t¯ > 0
such that if t ∈ (0, t¯] then the set of y˜ ∈ (∆−)U such that
∑
i∈U y˜
i ≤ ω¯ + t(ωi − ωj) −∑
i/∈S x
i is nonempty (and, for constraint qualification, contains an element that satisfies
all constraints with slack).
Consider the problem
maxy˜∈(∆U−)
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(y˜i)∑
i∈U y˜
i ≤ ω¯ + t(ωi − ωj)−∑i∈S xi
Note that for each t ∈ (0, t¯] there exists (ν(t), γ(t), α(t)) such that
v(t) = sup{
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui·y˜i+ν(t)·(ω¯−
∑
i∈S
y˜i+t(ωi−ωj))−
∑
i∈U
y˜i)+
∑
i∈U
γi(t)(1−
∑
l∈[L]
y˜il)+
∑
i∈U
αi(t)y˜
i
l .}
Here ν(t) is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that
∑
i∈U y˜
i ≤ ω¯−∑i∈S xi+t(ωi−
ωj), while γ(t) and α(t) are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraint that (y˜i) ∈ (∆−)N .
Choose a selection (ν(t), γ(t), α(t)) such that ν(0) = p.
Let ω˜ = ω¯ −∑i∈S xi. The saddle point inequalities imply that
(t′ − t)ν(t) · (ωi − ωj) =
∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(xi(t′)) + ν(t) · (ω˜ + t′(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈U
xi(t′))
+
∑
i∈U
γi(t)(1−
∑
l∈[L]
xil(t
′)) +
∑
i∈U
αi(t)x
i
l(t
′)
−
(∑
i∈U
1
λi
ui(xi(t′)) + ν(t) · (ω˜ + t(ωi − ωj)−
∑
i∈U
xi(t′))
+
∑
i∈U
γi(t)(1−
∑
l∈[L]
xil(t
′)) +
∑
i∈U
αi(t)x
i
l(t
′)
)
≥ v(t′)− v(t)
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Now recall that ν(0) = p. Then Lemma 11, together with the above inequality, imply
that
0 > p · (ωi − ωj)t′ ≥ v(t′)− v(0)
for all t′ > 0 with t′ ≤ t¯.
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